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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-SENTENCING-FEDERAL SENTENC-
ING JUDGE MAY CONSIDER DEFENDANT'S FALSE TRIAL TESTI-
MONY-United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978).
In United States v. GraysonI a divided2 United States Supreme
Court held that a federal sentencing judge may properly consider the
false trial testimony of a defendant as "probative of his prospects for
rehabilitation."3 The majority further announced that a sentence
imposed within statutory limits but enhanced because of judicial
consideration that the defendant lied under oath, constitutes neither
punishment without due process for the crime of perjury nor imper-
missible "chilling" of any of a criminal defendant's rights to testify
on his own behalf.4
Grayson, the respondent, who was serving a three year sentence
for a controlled substances conviction, left the Allenwood Federal
Prison Camp and was apprehended two days later in New York
City. 5 He was subsequently indicted for escape in violation of fed-
eral law6 and found guilty in a jury trial in the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.7 The sole defense
raised was duress,' and Grayson testified that his life had been
threatened by inmates to whom he owed gambling debts.9
I. 438 U.S. 41 (1978).
2. Mr. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the six member majority. Mr. Jus-
tice Stewart filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Mar-
shall.
3. 438 U.S. at 52.
4. Id. at 53.
5. 98 S. Ct. at 2612.
6. The statute, 18 U.S.C. § 751(a) (1976), provides in part,
Whoever escapes or attempts to escape . . .from any institution or facility in
which he is confined by direction of the Attorney General. . .shall, if the custody or
confinement is by virtue of ... conviction of any offense, be fined not more than
$5000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both....
7. United States v. Grayson, No. 75-221 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 1976), rev'd on rehearing,
550 F.2d 103 (3d Cir. 1977), rev'd 438 U.S. 41 (1978).
8. A classic definition of the duress or coercion defense is given in Shannon v. United
States, 76 F.2d 490, 493 (10th Cir. 1935).
Coercion which will excuse the commission of a criminal act must be immediate and
of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily
injury if the act is not done. One who has full opportunity to avoid the act without
danger of that kind cannot invoke the doctrine of coercion and is not entitled to an
instruction submitting the question to the jury.
The majority of federal courts have been reluctant to accept a duress defense in escape cases.
See generally W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAW 375-81 (1972); MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.09(1) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
9. Grayson testified that Barnes, an inmate to whom Grayson owed gambling debts,
made threats with a large stick from which a nail protruded. Grayson claimed that many
inmates witnessed the confrontation, but only one inmate testified for Grayson, claiming that
Barnes had done nothing more than speak loudly to defendant on one occasion. Barnes also
At the sentencing hearing the district judge stated that in arriv-
ing at the sentence of two years, he had considered defendant's testi-
mony, which the judge referred to as "a complete fabrication."'"
The decision was affirmed without opinion by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Grayson applied for a re-
hearing, alleging that the court of appeals had failed to follow its
prior holding in Poteet v. Fauver" that a defendant's false testimony
was not to be considered in sentencing. 2 Upon rehearing, a divided
panel of the court of appeals directed that the sentence be vacated
and that there be a resentencing. 3 The Supreme Court granted cer-
testified and disavowed that he made any threats or physical assault on Grayson or that Gray-
son owed him gambling debts.
Grayson's testimony regarding whether he had ever reported his fear of being harmed to
any officials was uncertain; he said that he might have asked hypothetically about what he
should do if someone attacked or threatened him, but that he had not said anything directly
about his fears. The official in charge of the prison camp said that although Grayson had the
opportunity to report threats, defendant had never mentioned any problems.
Further conflicting testimony concerned Grayson's prison clothing. Defendant testified
that he had unpremediatedly left the camp and hitchhiked to New York after removing his
prison shirt and jacket. In reality, a pair of trousers was also found outside the fence after
Grayson's departure, leading the prosecution to suggest that Grayson did not hitchhike but
prearranged to meet a woman friend who frequently visited him. 438 U.S. at 43 & n.I. See
generally Record of Feb. 5 & 6, 1976, United States v. Grayson, No. 75-221 (M.D. Pa., Mar.
12, 1976).
10. At sentencing Judge Muir announced,
I'm going to give my reasons for sentencing in this case with clarity, because one
of the reasons may well be considered by a Court of Appeals to be impermissible;
and although I could come into this Court Room and sentence the Defendant to a
five-year prison term without any explanation at all, I think it is fair that I give the
reasons so that if the Court of Appeals feels that one of the reasons which I am about
to enunciate is an improper consideration for a trial judge, then the Court will be in a
position to reverse this court and send the case back for resentencing.
In my view a prison sentence is indicated, and the sentence the Court is going to
impose is to deter you, Mr. Grayson, and others who are similarly situated. Sec-
ondly, it is my view that your defense was a complete fabrication without the slightest
merit whatsoever. Ifeel it isproperfor me to consider thatfact in the sentencing, and!
will do so.
438 U.S. at 44 (emphasis in original).
Judge Muir could have imposed the maximum sentence without explanation since federal
sentencing judges do not have to give reasons for sentences. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b)(1). If the
judge had not made his "laudable explanation" for Grayson's sentence, neither the defendant
nor the appellate court could have known that the sentence had been enhanced because the
judge believed defendant had testified falsely. Id. at 55 n. I (Stewart, J., dissenting).
I1. 517 F.2d 393 (3d Cir. 1975).
12. In Poteet the issue was whether the sentence was enhanced because the defendant
refused to admit his participation in a bank robbery following a jury verdict of guilty. At the
sentencing hearing, the judge unsuccessfully tried to persuade Poteet to confess participation
in the crime. Poteet was sentenced to fourteen years in prison; yet a co-defendant, who impli-
cated Poteet and admitted his own guilt, was sentenced to five years in a reformatory. Because
of due process violations, the appellate court reversed and remanded for a new sentencing
proceeding. The court stated, "A defendant has a right to defend, and although he is not
privileged to commit perjury in that defense, the sentencing judge may not add a penalty
cause he believes the defendant lied." Id at 395.
13. United States v. Grayson, 550 F.2d 103 (3d Cir. 1977). Each of the three panel mem-
bers wrote separate opinions. Two judges concluded that resentencing was required because
of the Poteet holding. Id at 105-08. The dissenting judge dismissed Poteet as inapplicable to
the facts in Grayson and would have affirmed the sentence of the district court. Id at 108-14.
tiorari'4 "to resolve conflicts between holdings of the Courts of Ap-
peals ''  and reversed and remanded for reinstatement of the
sentence of the district court.'
6
In reaching its decision, the Court discussed its earlier opinion
in Williams P. New York, " in which it upheld against a constitu-
tional due process challenge a judicially imposed death sentence that
conflicted with the jury recommendation of life imprisonment.'
8
The New York procedural policy that was approved in Williams al-
lowed judges the broad discretion to "consider information about
the convicted person's past life, health, habits, conduct, and mental
and moral propensities" to impose individualized sentences.' 9 Con-
sideration of this information was encouraged even though obtained
out of court where defendant had no opportunity to confront or
cross-examine the source.2" Defendant's allegation that due process
had been denied him through the judge's use of a presentence report
was dismissed on both a historical and a practical basis for different
evidentiary rules applicable to the trial and sentencing procedures.2'
The Williams court, though recognizing federal support of
presentence investigations as a "manifestation of the historical lati-
tude allowed sentencing judges, ' 22 nevertheless expressly stated that
its decision did not immunize sentencing procedure from scrutiny for
due process violations.23
14. United States v. Grayson, 434 U.S. 816 (1977).
15. 438 U.S. at 42.
16. Id. at 55.
17. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
18. Id
19. Id at 245.
20. Id
21. Id at 246-47. For examples of early statutes providing for "discretion of the court,"
see Alschuler, Judicial Sentencing Discretion, in DETERMINATE SENTENCING 63 (1978).
The practical basis for not using the same rules for both trial and sentencing proceedings
was stated as follows:
[These riules of evidence have been fashioned for criminal trials . . . to prevent a
time consuming and confusing trial of collateral issues. . . [and] to prevent tribunals
• . . from being influenced to convict. . . by evidence that the defendant had habitu-
ally engaged in other misconduct. A sentencing judge, however, is not confined to
the narrow issue of guilt. . . . Highly relevant-if not essential--to his selection of
an appropriate sentence is the possession of the fullest information possible concern-
ing the defendant's life and characteristics.
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949).
22. Id at 246. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2).
23. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 252 n.18 (1949). The reference to "sentencing
procedure" is significant because appellate courts in the United States generally refused to
review sentence length both before and after the Williams decision unless the process used in
arriving at sentence was defective or the sentence was in excess of statutory limits. See
generally Burr, 4ppellate Review as a Means of Controlling Criminal Sentencing Discretion-4
Workable Alternative?, 33 U. PTT. L. REV. I (1971); Mueller, Penology on Appeal: Appellate
Review of Legal but Excessive Sentences, 15 VAND. L. REV. 671 (1962); Sobeloff, A Recommen-
dationforAppellate Review of Criminal Sentences, 21 BROOKLYN L. REV. 2 (1954); Note, Appel-
late Review of Sentencing and the Needfor a Reviewable Record, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1357; Note,
Appellate Review of Primary Sentencing Decisions A Connecticut Case Study, 69 YALE L.J.
1453 (1960).
Prior to the Grayson holding, courts concluded that it was
within a sentencing judge's discretion to consider a criminal defend-
ant's past life and habits;24 age, health, and family situation;25 char-
acter;26 and aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to
defendant's participation in the crime.27 In addition, prior miscon-
duct, including uncharged criminal acts, 28 refusal to cooperate with
law enforcement officials about the criminal involvement of others,29
arrests,3 ° pending indictments,3  dismissed charges, 32 charges re-
versed on appeal, 33 and even charges that have ended in acquittal,
34
may properly influence the sentence.35  The major limitation ex-
pressed by the courts is that matters considered must be reliably es-
tablished and reasonably related to the purpose of sentencing. 6
At one time criminal defendants in both England and the
United States had no right to speak at trial; later they were permitted
For a summary of arguments for and against review of judicial sentencing discretion,
compare Brewster, Appellate Review of Sentences, 40 F.R.D. 79, 82-83 (1966) with Kennedy,
Justice Is Found in the Hearts and Minds of Free Men, 30 F.R.D. 401, 424-25 (1961). The
"parrot case" to which each argument refers is Duke v. United States, 255 F.2d 721 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 357 U.S. 920 (1958).
24. See, e.g., United States v. Marcello, 423 F.2d 993, 1012 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 959 (1970).
25. See, e.g., Welch v. United States, 371 F.2d 287, 294 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
957 (1966).
26. See, e.g., Baker v. United States, 388 F.2d 931, 934 (4th Cir. 1968) ("general conduct
and behavior. . . land] reputation in the community in regard to honesty, rectitude and ful-
fillment of. . civic and domestic responsibilities").
27. See, e.g., Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 586 (1959) (kidnapping in course of
which defendant's victim was shot and killed); United States v. Crow Dog, 537 F.2d 308, 310
(8th Cir. 1976) (defendant's leadership role in holding several men, women, and children cap-
tive and threatening them).
28. See, e.g., United States v. Bass, 535 F.2d 110, 118-20 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (defendant's
involvement in drug dealing on a large scale); United States v. Crowe, 516 F.2d 824, 826 (4th
Cir. 1975) (defendant's telephoning co-defendant's attorney and offering not to testify in return
for a $700 payment); United States v. Strauss, 443 F.2d 986, 990-91 (1st Cir.) (defendant's
membership in an organized crime syndicate), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 851 (1971).
29. See, e.g., Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371 (1951); United States v. Ver-
meulen, 436 F.2d 72, 76-77 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 911 (1971). Cf United States
v. Hayward, 471 F.2d 388, 391 (7th Cir. 1972) (defendant's refusal to reveal source of stolen
goods held a proper basis for judge's denial of probation).
30. See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 244 (1949); Houle v. United States,
493 F.2d 915, 915 (5th Cir. 1974).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 507 F.2d 826, 829-30 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 949 (1975); United States v. Metz, 470 F.2d 1140, 1141-42 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied
sub nom. Davenport v. United States, 411 U.S. 919 (1973).
32. See, e.g., United States v. Marines, 535 F.2d 552, 554-55 (10th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715, 721 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 843 (1965).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Atkins, 480 F.2d 1223, 1224 (9th Cir. 1973).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Cardi, 519 F.2d 309, 314 n.3 (7th Cir. 1975); United States
v. Sweig, 454 F.2d 181, 184 (2d Cir. 1972).
35. Congress as well as the courts, has realized the necessity of providing a federal sen-
tencing judge with a variety of information. 18 U.S.C. § 3577 (1976) provides, "No limitation
shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a
person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for
the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence."
36. See, e.g., United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972); Townsend v. Burke, 334
U.S. 736, 741 (1948). For further discussion of limitations on sentencing discretion, see notes
64-65 and accompanying text infra
to make unsworn statements and to speak before sentencing oc-
curred and, finally, to testify on their own behalf.37 The logical in-
ference, and one that finds support in the courts of appeals decisions
that allowed consideration of false testimony,38 is that when defend-
ants gained the right to speak, the sentencing judge gained the right
to consider what they said.39 Despite the Miranda v. Arizona4" safe-
guards of recent vintage, the Court has held that no constitutional
right exists to commit perjury4 and that a defendant who chooses to
testify assumes the risk of a perjury prosecution.42 Additionally, a
defendant who appeals "successfully" may have his punishment in-
creased on resentencing,4 3 even when a sentencing jury is assessing
"the demeanor and character of the accused,"" as long as the in-
crease does not result from vindictiveness.
45
The first false testimony case that rejected federal appellate re-
view of sentence was Peterson v. United States,46 in which defendant,
who was convicted of stealing a post office money order stamp val-
ued at forty cents, was sentenced to three years, the maximum im-
prisonment for the offense.47 An unsuccessful appeal was grounded
in the district judge's statement in a letter written several months
after sentencing that "the main reason for the severe sentence im-
37. For a discussion of this historical background, see Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570,
573-83 (1961) (state statute that followed the common law rule that defendant was incompe-
tent to testify on his own behalf held unconstitutional).
38. See United States v. Nunn, 525 F.2d 958, rehearing denied, 527 F.2d 1390 (5th Cir.
1976); United States v. Hendrix, 505 F,2d 1233 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975);
Hess v. United States, 496 F.2d 936 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v. Moore, 484 F.2d 1284 (4th
Cir. 1973); United States v. Cluchette, 465 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Wallace,
418 F.2d 876 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied 397 U.S. 955 (1970); United States v. Levine, 372
F.2d 70 (7th Cir. 1967); Williams v. United States, 273 F.2d 469 (10th Cir. 1959).
39. See generally, Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 573-83 (1961).
40. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174, 178-80 (1977); Harris v. New York,
401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971). See also Note, The Exclusionary Rule v. Perjurious Testimony, 33 U.
PITT. L. REV. 135 (1971).
42. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58 (1951). See also United States v.
Manfredonia, 414 F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1969).
43. See, e.g., Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919), appeal dismissed 283 F.2d 137
(10th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 864 (1961); United States v. Sanders, 435 F.2d 165 (9th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 944 (1971).
44. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 32 (1973). For a discussion of this decision, see
78 DICK. L. REV. 597 (1974).
45. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 724 (1969). The Pearce Court held
that if a harsher sentence is imposed upon retrial, the judge must give reasons "based upon
objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring
after the original sentencing proceeding." Id at 726.
A further safeguard was stressed in United States v. Durbin, 542 F.2d 486, 487 (8th Cir.
1976), in which the court said that a harsher punishment upon resentencing is proscribed un-
less the defendant has had a new trial or reconviction. See also Van Alstyne, In Gideon's
Wake: Harsher Penalties and the "Successful" Criminal Appellant, 74 YALE L.J. 606, 634-35
(1965). For study results advocating that the same judge preside at both the trial and the
sentencing hearing, see ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, SENTENCING
ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES, Comment a to § 5.1(a), at 232 (Approved Draft, 1968).
46. 246 F. 118 (4th Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 246 U.S. 661 (1918).
47. Id
posed. . . was the subornation of perjury."48 The Peterson rule that
false testimony was a proper sentencing consideration was subse-
quently adopted in seven other circuits.49
As early as 1951 the Tenth Circuit concluded that a convicted
defendant's willingness to perjure himself or to suborn perjury was a
proper sentencing consideration." Although a majority of the cir-
cuits agreed that perjurious conduct could be considered, they did
not reach a uniform standard of whether proof of falsity had to be
beyond a reasonable doubt or to some lesser degree,5 ' a serious
shortcoming because some judges seem to "presume . . . perjury
from the mere fact of conviction."52 The Grayson dissent 53 recog-
nized this problem and pointed to the majority's lack of "limitations
or safeguards to minimize a defendant's rational fear that his truth-
ful testimony will be perceived as false." 54
Emphasizing its belief in an individual's ability and duty to
choose freely between good and evil,55 the Court rejected both the
due process56 and the "chilling" effect arguments of Grayson. 57 Re-
spondent argued that although it might be permissible to consider
untruthfulness of a defendant "for the purpose of illuminating his
need for rehabilitation and society's need for protection,"58 it was
impermissible "for the purpose of saving the Government the bur-
48. Id at 119. The appellate court held that although a milder sentence would have
sufficed, defendant offered no evidence that proved he was being punished for the perjury
offense.
49. See note 39 supra. The Fourth Circuit, upon re-exmination of the Peterson holding,
decided to continue following it. Mr. Justice Craven's concurring opinion, however, pointed to
the outmoded nature of the Peterson rule and asserted that "the assumption that one who lies
under stress has less capacity for rehabilitation than one who pleads not guilty and fails to
testify . . . is a better question for psychiatrists than it is for judges. ... United States v.
Moore, 484 F.2d 1284, 1288 (4th Cir. 1973) (Craven, J., concurring). Judge Craven also gave
another reason against the rule: "Truth is, indeed, stranger than fiction, and every one of us
knows of at least one cock-and-bull story, believed by no one, that turned out to be true." Id
50. Humes v. United States, 186 F.2d 875, 878 (10th Cir. 1951).
51. Compare United States v. Hendrix, 505 F.2d 1233, 1234 (2d Cir. 1974) (judge "con-
vinced beyond a reasonable doubt" of defendant's perjury), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975)
with Hess v. United States, 496 F.2d 936 (8th Cir. 1974) (judge's "personal belief' or "prima
facie belief' of defendant's perjury).
52. See Note, The Influence of the Defendant's Plea on Judicial Determination of Sentence,
66 YALE L.J. 204, 212 (1956).
53. 438 U.S. at 55-58 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 57. In emphasizing its commitment to an individualized sentencing proce-
dure that permits the judge to consider anything that appears relevant to rehabilitation, the
majority never adequately addressed a major point underlying Grayson's two main arguments;
namely, that the judge may be mistaken in his belief that the defendant perjured himself. The
Court focused on the propriety of using certain information, rather than on the more crucial
question whether the information was accurate. Perhaps the Court was no more worried about
the reliability of the sentencing judge's perception of defendant's testimony than about any
other information that he may consider in sentencing.
55. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952).
56. 438 U.S. at 53-55.
57. Id. at 55.
58. Id. at 53.
den of bringing a separate and subsequent perjury prosecution."59
Since both practices would result in more time in prison, Grayson
contended that they were not separately identifiable and that all con-
siderations of false testimony would have to be excluded from what
was otherwise broad and unlimited inquiry.6"
Grayson attempted to bring a defendant's untruthfulness at trial
within the scope of exceptions to the nonreview tradition of the ap-
pellate courts. In 1960 United States v. Wiley6 had pierced the veil
of nonreview and had become "the first rumbling presaging a con-
ceivable penological eruption in the federal appellate courts."' 62 Fol-
lowing Wiley, some courts distinguished between reviewing a
sentence and holding that certain information should be excluded
from sentencing consideration.63 Others held that "[a]lthough well
established doctrine bars review of the exercise of sentencing discre-
tion, limited review is available when sentencing discretion is not
exercised at all."'  It was within the former category that the
Grayson court could have placed defendant's false trial testimony.
The Court, however, refused to adopt the reasoning of Wiley
and supporting cases and used a three-pronged approach to rebut
the due process argument that the sentence punished Grayson for
perjury without an indictment, trial or conviction. First, citing its
discussion of the history of sentencing and the discretion permitted a
trial judge in the sentencing process, the Court stated that for a judge
59. Id
60. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972).
61. 278 F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1960).
62. Mueller, supra note 24, at 683.
63. United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626, 631 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1061
(1972) (conclusions based upon unsubstantiated reports of an informer about defendant's prior
criminal narcotics activity). For further examples of information that cannot be used as a
sentencing consideration see United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972); Townsend v. Burke,
334 U.S. 736 (1948); United States v. Cavazos, 530 F.2d 4 (5th Cir. 1976); Verdugo v. United
States, 402 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 961 (1971). But see Barnes v. Estelle,
518 F.2d 182 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1036 (1975) (introduction of invalid convictions
is harmless error when the judge certified that the facts of the case and four valid felony
convictions were sufficient to support the sentence); United States v. Schipani, 435 F.2d 26 (2d
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983 (1971) (illegal wiretapping evidence held reliable when
clearly not gathered for the express purpose of influencing the sentencing judge).
64. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 443 (1974) (requirement that judge not
sentence young offender to incarceration instead of treatment under the Youth Corrections Act
without making an express finding on the record of "no benefit" to the offender if a lesser
penalty were imposed). See 18 U.S.C. § 5010(d) (1976).
For other examples of what constitutes an abuse ofjudicial discretion see United States v.
Dinapoli, 519 F.2d 104 (6th Cir. 1975); United States v. Daniels, 446 F.2d 967 (6th Cir. 1971);
Leach v. United States, 320 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1963); see also 18 U.S.C. § 4208(b)-(c) (1976).
Failure to order a presentence investigation is generally not considered an abuse ofjudi-
cial discretion. See Howard v. Maggio, 540 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir. 1976). The Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure require only that if a defendant is convicted, an investigation be con-
ducted unless the defendant waives it with the court's permission, or unless the court finds the
record to contain "information sufficient to enable the meaningful exercise of sentencing dis-
cretion, and the court explains this finding on the record." FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(1). The
judge who sentenced Grayson had ordered a presentence investigation. United States v. Gray-
son, 438 U.S. 43, 44 (1978).
not to be permitted to consider "the defendant's whole person and
personality" would indeed cause sentencing procedure to degenerate
into a "game of chance."65 Second, the Court cited Williams as fully
supporting its decision because the Williams judge had properly con-
sidered "the offender's history of prior antisocial conduct. ' 66 The
Court accepted the risk, as it had in Williams, that the judge could
improperly use his knowledge. 67  Third, the Court rejected Gray-
son's suggested "exclusionary rule" and indicated that no rule of law
could ever encompass every "improper use of firsthand observations
of perjury' ' 68 and that the better course was to rely on the "integrity
of the judges, and their fidelity to their oaths of office" as adequate
assurance against misuse.69
Grayson further alleged an impermissible "chilling" effect on
the rights7" of criminal defendants to testify on their own behalf if
sentencing judges were allowed to consider false trial testimony.7' In
rejecting this contention, the Court referred to the constitutionality
of the perjury statutes7 2 and to the inability of counsel ethically to be
a party to perjurious conduct.73 The Court indicated that any "chil-
ling" that might occur would be permissible because the commission
of perjury carries no protected right.74 Stressing that the decision
would not require enhancing "in some wooden or reflex fashion, the
sentences of all defendants whose testimony is deemed false,"75 the
Court negated an inflexible approach and summarized that the sen-
tencing judge is authorized to evaluate defendant's testimony, deter-
mine its trustworthiness and "assess in light of all the other
knowledge gained about the defendant the meaning of that conduct
with respect to his prospects for rehabilitation and restoration to a
65. 438 U.S. at 53.
66. Id. at 53-54.
67. Id. at 54.
68. Id.
69. Id
70. The Supreme Court has not specifically decided whether defendant's fight to testify is
guaranteed by the Constitution. See United States v. Ives, 504 F.2d 935 (9th Cir. 1974), va-
cated and remanded, 421 U.S. 944 (1975). The right is one granted by state and federal compe-
tency statutes. The federal statute provides that "the person charged shall, at his own request,
be a competent witness." 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1976). Nevertheless, "a strong argument can be
made that. . . [the right to testify] is constitutionally guaranteed because the defendant's op-
portunity to present a defense and to be heard would be seriously impaired if he were not
permitted to present testimony as a witness." Comment, The Perjury Dilemma in an Adversary
System, 82 DICK. L. REV. 545, 556-57 (1978).
71. 438 U.S. at 54.
72. Cf. United States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174 (1977) (defendant not entitled to forewarn-
ing of the possibility of a prosecution for perjury even though not fully informed of the right to
remain silent).
73. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 98 S. Ct. 1173 (1978); ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, §§ 7.5(a)
and 7.7(c), at 267 and 275, respectively (1971). See generaly Comment, note 70 supra.
74. See note 42 and accompanying text supra.
75. 438 U.S. at 55.
useful place in society. ' 6
Mr. Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion commenced with an at-
tack on the majority's assumption that the defendant's testimony was
false and stressed that the sentencing judge merely thought that per-
jury had been committed.77 The dissent saw in the majority decision
a unique risk, put on/y on criminal defendants who choose to testify,
of additional incarceration as a result of the "disbelief of a single
listener."7 The minority implicitly rejected the majority view that
protection would be afforded by judicial integrity,79 since "without
doubting the sincerity of trial judges one may doubt whether the sin-
gle incident of a defendant's trial testimony could ever alter the as-
sessment of rehabilitative prospects so drastically as to justify a
perceptibly greater sentence." ' In addition, though a jury may be
instructed to disregard that defendant did not take the stand, juries
generally do not acquit defendants who fail to testify.8'
The dissent emphasized that defendants who choose to testify
76. Id
77. Id See note 10 supra. In dismissing as frivolous Grayson's argument that the chal-
lenged sentencing practice could inhibit a defendant's right to testify truthfully, the majority
merely asserted that because a judge need not enhance the sentence of a defendant whose
testimony is deemed false, the defendant should not be apprehensive about testifying; the
judge will evaluate the defendant's testimony "with a consciousness of the frailty of human
judgment." Id. It is questionable, however, whether such a "safeguard" assures that the mat-
ter considered has been reliably established, a longstanding limitation on what a judge may
consider in sentencing, see note 37 supra. Moreover, whether defendant's knowledge of the
safeguard will encourage him to overcome his legitimate fear that his testimony may be
deemed false is likewise open to doubt, especially if his testimony is at all incredible.
78. Id. at 58.
Besides its impact on a criminal defendant's ability and desire to testify, the Court's deci-
sion raises two disturbing questions about the judge's and defense counsel's conduct at trial.
When a defendant's testimony is so blatantly perjurious that the trial judge notices it, the
perjury should be equally plain to defense counsel. Yet if the judge is willing to recognize the
defendant's perjury in sentencing, assuming counsel was aware of the false testimony, may the
judge ignore defense counsel's obvious violation of the ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPON-
SIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(4)?
Of course, if defense counsel did not know until after his client took the stand that defend-
ant would perjure himself, counsel could not be blamed for any unethical conduct. Neverthe-
less, even if counsel does not know beforehand that the defendant will lie, when his client's
perjury comes to light he should not continue to elicit defendant's testimony on direct, nor
should he argue, recite or rely on his testimony in his closing argument. (The Grayson major-
ity clearly approved of this course of conduct when, in referring to the attorney's duty in
dealing with a perjurious client, it cited ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE, THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 7.7. 98 S. Ct. at 2618).
A second question arises when the defendant's testimony is not obviously perjurious but
could be interpreted as false. When this occurs, may the judge assume that the defendant
committed perjury and increase his sentence, but at the same time, assume that defense coun-
sel did not know the testimony was perjurious? One could propound a strong argument that if
a judge enhances a defendant's sentence because of what he perceives to be the defendant's
false testimony, he should report the attorney to the local disciplinary board or at least repri-
mand the attorney for unethical conduct; denying the criminal defendant the benefit of the
doubt just because he is a criminal and attributing good faith to defense counsel just because
he is an attorney does not seem entirely sound.
79. Id. at 54. See note 69 supra.
80. Id. at 56 n.3.
8 1. Note, The Influence of the Defendant's Plea on Judicial Determination of Sentence,
supra note 53, at 212 n.36.
after Grayson may risk not only sentence enhancement on the basis
of inaccurate information82 if the judge is wrong, but also may place
themselves at the mercy of his "unreviewable perception that the tes-
timony was untruthful"83 since judges are not required to give their
reasons for the sentence imposed.84 That a judge may honestly, but
incorrectly, believe a defendant lied under oath is not unlikely, for
under the Grayson facts, the jury might have believed everything de-
fendant said and still have returned a guilty verdict by finding that
an ordinary man, faced with the same degree of duress, would not
have escaped confinement.8" A verdict of guilty of the crime charged
is not equivalent to a verdict of guilty of perjury.
The Grayson holding fails to address the need suggested by
some authorities for a record of sentencing proceedings,86 which
need is possibly more acute if judges may consider a defendant's
false trial testimony.87 Grayson also ignores, by emphasizing the free
will to choose between right and wrong, the lack of substantiation
for the belief that nonperjurers have better prospects for rehabilita-
tion than have perjurers.8 The Court's decision is not surprising,
82. See Harris v. New York, 382 U.S. 162 (1965).
83. 438 U.S. at 57.
84. See note 10 supra.
85. 438 U.S. at 57 n.4. Grayson's counsel made essentially the same argument:
Thus, it is entirely within the relm [sic] of possibility that the jury believed Respon-
dent's testimony that he left Allenwood because of the threats against him, but never-
theless found him guilty because the jury felt he should have sought protection from
the Allenwood authorities rather than leaving the camp. Alternatively, the jury could
have felt that the Respondent's leaving the camp because of the threats was reason-
able, but that he voluntarily decided to remain at large since he went to his apartment
in New York City for two days rather than immediately turning himself in to the
proper authorities.
Brief for Respondent in Opposition to a Grant of Certiorari, at 7, United States v. Grayson,
438 U.S. 41 (1978).
86. See, e.g., ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, SEN-
TENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES, Comment b to § 5.6, at 270-71 (Approved Draft,
1968). The comment lists four reasons why ajudge at the time a sentence is imposed should be
required to state the reasons that underlie the sentence.
[A] statement of reasons by the sentencing judge should greatly increase the rational-
ity of sentences; such a statement by the sentencing judge can be of value to correc-
tions authorities; such a statement can be of therapeutic value to the defendant; and a
statement is of significant value to an appellate court faced with the prospect of re-
viewing the sentence.
Id
87. See, e.g., Comment, Discretionary Penalty Increases on the Basis of Suspected Perjury,
1975 U. ILL. L.F. 677. One general sentencing reform that was found "specifically applicable
to problems inherent in perjury sentencing" was the requirement of a record, a reform ap-
proach described as "essentially a compromise between precluding discretion completely and
permitting unfettered discretion." Id at 690-91. The advantage of a mandatory record is that
the judge would have to review the trial record to find instances of perjury, rather than simply
relying on "his memory of personal impressions at the time the testimony was given." Id at
691. A reviewable record could serve as a safeguard against what one justice called "judgment
by hunch." United States v. Moore, 484 F.2d 1284, 1288 (4th Cir. 1973) (Craven, J., concur-
ring).
88. Comment, Discretionary Penalty Increases on the Basis of Suspected Perjury, supra
note 87, at 689. In addition, no evidence exists that "perjurers need more rehabilitation than
defendants who plead guilty, remain silent, or testify honestly." Id at 692.
however, because Grayson v. United States strengthens a tradition of
respect for judicial discretion in the imposition of individualized
sentences.
In the abstract, the plight of criminal defendants appears worse
than it was prior to the Grayson89 decision. The Grayson holding,
however, does not require a sentencing judge ever to impose a har-
sher sentence, even in the face of flagrant perjury. The decision
merely permits him to impose such a sentence if, "in light of all the
other knowledge gained about the defendant," the judge determines
that the conduct indicates lessened "prospects for rehabilitation and
restoration to a useful place in society."9 Future problems posed by
Grayson could find at least partial solution if the appellate courts are
willing to exercise a review power they possess9' but seldom use
when sentences are within statutory limits.92 If one of the aims of
sentencing is deterrence, as the district judge who sentenced Grayson
believed,9 3 certainly a decision by the Supreme Court that perjury
could never be considered in sentencing, coupled with the fact that
the majority of defendants who are found guilty are not prosecuted
for perjury,9 4 could present a greater threat to the criminal justice
system in the United States than could the Grayson position that
consideration of perjury is proper but not mandatory in sentencing.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-PROBABLE CAUSE-INFORMATION
SUPPLIED BY NAMED CITIZEN HELD TO BE INADEQUATE TO Es-
TABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE FOR AN ARREST. Commonwealth v.
Stokes, - Pa. -, 389 A.2d 74 (1978).
In Commonwealth v. Stokes' the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
89. In reality Grayson approves a practice already permitted in more than seventy per-
cent of the circuits. See note 39 supra.
90. 438 U.S. at 55.
91. The relevant statute provides as follows:
The Supreme Court or any other court of appellate jurisdiction may affirm, modify,
vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or order of a court lawfully brought
before it for review, and may remand the cause and direct the entry of such appropri-
ate judgment, decree, or order, or require such further proceedings to be had as may
be just under the circumstances.
28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1976).
92. See note 24 and accompanying text supra.
93. See 438 US. at 44.
94. A survey of the circuit cases cited in note 39 supra supports this view. Many defend-
ants who are found guilty may also have committed perjury, but the number of perjury prose-
cutions does not reflect that likelihood.
[Casenote by Mary Pauline Finan]
I. - Pa. -, 389 A.2d 74 (1978).
confronted the troublesome2 and recurring3 question of when proba-
ble cause for an arrest may be established solely upon information
from an informant.4 The information supplied by the informant was
significantly unique5 in that it consisted of a signed written statement
in which the informant reported that the defendant told him of his
participation in a murder. A majority 6 of the court held that while
this information would be legally sufficient to convict the defendant
if testified to by the informant, it nonetheless was insufficient to es-
tablish probable cause for his arrest because the Commonwealth
failed to establish the trustworthiness of the informant as required by
Aguilar v. Texas7 and Spinelli v. United States.8
The case arose out of the robbery and fatal shooting of John J.
Meehan, a thirty-eight year old white male, on Sixty-Third Street in
Philadelphia. An investigating detective stopped Gregory Staulings
and asked him about the Meehan homicide. Staulings informed the
detective that he had been told by another youth, Anthony Ramsey,
that David Stokes told Ramsey that "he and some guys had got a
2. See LaFave, Probable Causefrom Informants. The Effects of Murphy's Law on Fourth
Amendment Adjudication, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 2-3, 67 (1977).
3. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has frequently confronted the issue whether prob-
able cause for an arrest has been established solely upon the basis of information from an
informant. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Taylor, 472 Pa. 1, 370 A.2d 1197 (1977): Common-
wealth v. Brooks, 468 Pa. 547, 364 A.2d 652 (1976); Commonwealth v. Bailey, 460 Pa. 498, 333
A.2d 883 (1975); Commonwealth v. Lassiter, 457 Pa. 582, 321 A.2d 902 (1974): Commonwealth
v. Daniels, 455 Pa. 552, 317 A.2d 237 (1974); Commonwealth v. Smith, 453 Pa. 326, 309 A.2d
413 (1973); In re Betrand, 451 Pa. 381, 303 A.2d 486 (1973).
For a discussion of the increasing reliance by the police on information supplied by infor-
mants see Rebell, The Undisclosed Informant and the Fourth Amendment. A Search for Mean-
ingful Standards, 81 YALE L.J. 703 n.3, 708-12 (1972). Seegenerally M. HARNEY & J. CROSS,
THE INFORMER IN LAW ENFORCEMENT (2d ed. 1968); Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants,
Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent Provocateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091 (1951); Comment, An In-
former's Tale: Its Use in Judicial and Administrative Proceedings, 63 YALE L.J. 206 (1953).
4. In its broadest sense the word "informant" includes anyone who gives information to
the police, which is the interpretation employed by the Stokes court. Many courts and com-
mentators, however, use the term "informant" to refer only to a "professional" informant, that
is, a person who regularly supplies information to the police. These courts and writers draw a
distinction between the "professional" informer and the "citizen-informer" who, as a victim of
or a witness to criminal activity, gives information to the police as a matter of civic duty.
LaFave, supra note 2, at I n.5. See note 27 infra.
5. Stokes appears to be the first Pennsylvania case in which the informant's tip con-
sisted of information of the defendant's admission to his responsibility for a crime. Cf. People
v. Clay, 55 111. 2d 501, 304 N.E.2d 280 (1973) (informant notified police that a man on a street
corner told him that he commited a certain robbery); Comi v. State, 26 Md. App. 511, 338 A.2d
918 (1975) (informant reported that burglary participant told him that he and his friends had
committed a certain burglary); State v. Benoit, 83 Wis.2d 389, 265 N.W.2d 298 (1978) (inform-
ant, a robbery suspect's brother, informed police that his brother had told him that he had
commited the robbery).
6. Five Justices joined in the majority opinion, which was written by Chief Justice Ea-
gen, while Justices Pomeroy and Larsen filed dissenting opinions. Justice Manderino did not
participate in the decision. For an analysis of the substance and reasoning of the dissenting
opinion, see notes 49-52 and accompanying text infra.
7. 378 U.S. 108 (1964). See note 20 and accompanying text infra.
8. 393 U.S. 410 (1969). See note 21 and accompanying text infra.
body up on 63rd Street."9 The police then questioned Anthony
Ramsey, who confirmed Staulings' information and added that
Stokes had stated that "they had shot the white man on 63rd Street
when they were out to rob somebody and that the man died."' 0
Thereafter, Ramsey was interviewed at police headquarters where he
gave a signed statement. Solely on the basis of the information pro-
vided by Gregory Staulings and Anthony Ramsey, the police con-
cluded that probable cause existed to arrest David Stokes." The
police arrested Stokes at his home without a warrant and transported
him to homicide headquarters, where he admitted his participation
in Meehan's murder.'
2
The Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia granted Stokes'
motion to suppress the incriminating statements because the evi-
dence was the product of an illegal arrest.' 3 On appeal by the Com-
monwealth to the supreme court, the sole issue raised was whether
the information supplied by Staulings and Ramsey provided an ade-
quate basis for the police to conclude that probable cause existed to
arrest the defendant. Chief Justice Eagen announced that the police
did not have the requisite probable cause for the arrest because there
was insufficient evidence of the trustworthiness of the informer to
satisfy either the two-pronged test of Aguilar v. Texas, " as explicated
in Spinelli v. United States, ' 5 or the "substantial basis" test of United
States v. Harris.6 The court, therefore, affirmed the lower court's
decision that the arrest was illegal.
A police arrest without a warrant is constitutionally permissible
if it is based on probable cause. '" Probable cause to arrest without a
warrant exists "if the facts and circumstances which are within the
knowledge of the officer at the time of arrest, and of which he has
reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to warrant a man
9. - Pa. at -, 389 A.2d at 76. Subsequently, Staulings gave a written statement at
police headquarters. Id.
10. Id.
1I. None of the police investigating Meehan's murder had any information other than
that provided by Staulings and Ramsey. Id. at -, 389 A.2d at 76 n.3.
12. Id. at -, 389 A.2d at 76.
13. In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the Supreme Court held that any
evidence obtained by federal officers in violation of the fourth amendment would be barred
from a federal prosecution. This "exclusionary rule" was later extended to the states through
the fourteenth amendment in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), and Ker v. California, 374
U.S. 23 (1963). In Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), the Court ruled that a
verbal statement obtained "so immediately" from a violation of the fourth amendment consti-
tuted a "fruit" of official illegality and was subject to the exclusionary rule. Id at 485. The
Wong Sun decision is binding upon the states. See Traub v. Connecticut, 374 U.S. 493 (1963).
See also note 52 infra.
14. 378 U.S. 108 (1964). See note 20 and accompanying text infra.
15. 393 U.S. 410 (1969). See note 21 and accompanying text infra.
16. 403 U.S. 573 (1971). See notes 34-39 and accompanying text infra.
17. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Com-
monwealth v. Johnson, 467 Pa. 146, 354 A.2d 886 (1976). See also U.S. CONST. amend. IV;
PA. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
of reasonable caution in the belief that the suspect has committed or
is committing a crime."'" In Draper v. United States,'9 the United
States Supreme Court held that hearsay information is, in certain
circumstances, sufficient to establish probable cause for a warrantless
arrest. When probable cause for a warrantless arrest is based on
hearsay information, however, the arresting officer must satisfy the
following two-pronged test of Aguilar v. Texas,20 as refined in
Spinelli v. United States," before probable cause will be deemed to
have been established: "(1) he must know the underlying circum-
stances from which the informer concluded the suspect participated
in the crime; and, (2) he must have some reasonable basis for con-
cluding that the informant is credible or that his information is relia-
18. Commonwealth v. Garvin, 448 Pa. 258, 262, 293 A.2d 33, 36 (1972). Accord, Beck v.
Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 467 Pa. 146, 354 A.2d 886 (1976).
19. 358 U.S. 307 (1959). In Draper, a federal narcotics agent was told by an informer,
who had proved reliable in the past, that the defendant was peddling narcotics to addicts in the
city of Denver. The informant gave the agent an accurate, detailed physical description of
Draper, the clothing he was wearing, and the tan zipper bag he was carrying. The Supreme
Court held that on the basis of this information the agent had probable cause and reasonable
grounds for believing that the defendant was committing a violation of the federal narcotics
laws, and therefore, his arrest was lawful and the heroin discovered in the search incident to
the arrest was competent evidence. Prior to Draper, hearsay evidence could not be used in
federal courts to determine the existence of probable cause. Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 359, 362
(1966).
20. 378 U.S. 108 (1964). Although Aguilar v. Texas dealt with a warrant application, it is
well established that the two pronged test of Aguilar is to be applied in determining whether an
officer had probable cause to make a warrantless arrest based solely upon hearsay information.
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 417 n.5 (1969); McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 304
(1967); Commonwealth v. Smith, 453 Pa. 326, 328 n.2, 309 A.2d 413, 414 n.2 (1973); Common-
wealth v. Brown, 228 Pa. Super. Ct. 158, 161, 323 A.2d 104, 105 (1974). Cf. Whitely v. War-
den, Wyoming State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 566 (1971) (The standards a reviewing court
should employ in reviewing a police officer's assessment of probable cause as a prelude to an
arrest without a warrant are at least as stringent as a court would employ in reviewing a magis-
trate's assessment of probable cause as a prelude to issuing an arrest or search warrant).
21. 393 U.S. 410 (1969). In Spinelli the Supreme Court further explained the Aguilar
test, holding that the first part of the test, the "basis for the allegation of criminal activity"
prong, could be fulfilled without a statement of the circumstances from which the informer
based his information, if the informer described "the accused's criminal activity in sufficient
detail that the magistrate may know that he is relying on something more substantial than a
casual rumor circulating in the underworld and an accusation based merely on an individual's
general reputation." id at 416. The court offered little guidance for determining when an
informant's tip is detailed enough to be self-verifying.
The Spinelli court also modified the second prong of the Aguilar test, holding that in-
dependent police verification of suspicious conduct of the accused may be used to aid an other-
wise defective affidavit satisfy the second 4guilar prong of information reliability. The Court
held, however, that assertions by the affiant concerning the reputation of the accused could not
be used to satisfy the second part of the test.
For an in-depth analysis of the Aguilar-Spinelli standards see LaFave, supra note 2; Lev-
inson, Employment of Informant's Statements in Establishing Probable Cause for Issuance of a
Search Warrant, 4 J. MAR. J. PRAC. PROC. 38 (1970); Moylan, Hearsay and Probable Cause.'An
Aguilar and Spinelli Primer, 25 MERCER L. REV. 741 (1974); Comment, Informer's Word as the
Basis for Probable Cause in the Federal Courts, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 840 (1965); Comment, An
Informant's Tip as the Basis/or Probable Cause.- ModifiedAguilar Standards, 20 S.D. L. REV.
363 (1975); Note, The Informer's Ti as Probable Causefor Search or Arrest, 54 CORNELL L.
REV. 958 (1969).
ble." '22 The first part of the Aguilar-Spine//i test is often referred to as
the "basis of knowledge" prong, and the second part is frequently
called the "veracity" prong.
23
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has acknowledged that the
Aguilar-Spinelli standard is not the only means of establishing prob-
able cause from information supplied to the police. An uncorrobo-
rated confession of an accomplice that implicates a suspect, 24 the
statement of a victim identifying the perpetrator of a crime,25 and
information provided by an identified eyewitness 26 have been
deemed sufficient to establish probable cause for an arrest. The stric-
tures of Aguilar-Spinelli are not applicable in these situations be-
cause the information is not hearsay, but rather is based on first-
hand knowledge of the crime.27 Since the informant in the Stokes
case was not an accomplice, an eyewitness 28 or a victim of the crime,
the information he supplied to the police constituted hearsay, and,
therefore, was subject to the Aguilar-Spinelli requirements.
In applying the Aguilar-Spinelli test to the facts in Stokes, the
22. Commonwealth v. Stokes, - Pa. at -, 389 A.2d at 77.
23. Moylan, supra note 21, at 754-56.
24. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 467 Pa. 146, 354 A.2d 886 (1976); Commonwealth v.
Rush, 459 Pa. 23, 326 A.2d 340 (1974); Commonwealth v. Kenney, 449 Pa. 562, 297 A.2d 794
(1972); Commonwealth v. Bradley, 449 Pa. 19, 295 A.2d 842 (1972). See also Commonwealth
v. Matthews, 446 Pa. 65, 285 A.2d 510 (1971).
25. Commonwealth v. Hall, 456 Pa. 243, 317 A.2d 891 (1974).
26. Commonwealth v. Carter, 444 Pa. 405, 282 A.2d 375 (1971); Commonwealth v.
Crawley, 209 Pa. Super. Ct. 70, 223 A.2d 885 (1966). Cf. Commonwealth v. Mamon, 449 Pa.
249, 297 A.2d 471 (1972) (statements given to police by two eyewitnesses and victim of a crime
complemented each other sufficiently to provide the reliability necessary to create probable
cause for the issuance of a search warrant).
27. This exception to the Aguilar-Spinelli test is called the "citizen informer" rule by
many courts. United States v. Unger, 469 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1972); People v. Schulle, 51 Cal.
App. 3d 809, 124 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1975); People v. Glaubman, 175 Colo. 41, 485 P.2d 711
(1971); People v. Hoffman, 45 Ill. 2d 221, 258 N.E. 2d 326 (1970); State v. Rydel, - Iowa -,
262 N.W.2d 598 (1978); Frazier v. State, 480 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); State v.
Chatman, 9 Wash. App. 741, 515 P.2d 530 (1973); Loveday v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 503, 247
N.W.2d 116 (1976); B. GEORGE, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL
CASES 13 (1973). Cf. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 599 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
("ordinary citizen who has never before reported a crime to the police may, in fact, be more
reliable than one who supplies information on a regular basis"). By recognizing that informa-
tion provided by a witness or a victim of a crime is sufficient to establish probable cause for an
arrest, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has impliedly adopted the "citizen-informer" rule.
Several courts have extended the "citizen-informer" exception to situations in which the
citizen was not an accomplice, victim, or witness to the crime. People v. Edmonds, - Colo. -,
578 P.2d 655 (1978); People v. Hester, 39 I1. 2d 489, 237 N.E.2d 466 (1968). See also United
States v. Wilson, 479 F. 2d 936, 943 (7th Cir. 1973) (Kiley, J., dissenting); King v. State, 16 Md.
App. 546, -, 298 A.2d 446, 451 (1973) (dictum).
For a general discussion of the "citizen-informer" rule see Melvin, Reliability and the
First-Time Informant, I AM. J. CRIM. L. 283, 289-92 (1972); Moylan, supra note 21, at 765-73;
Comment, 20 S.D. L. REV. 363, supra note 21, at 370-71.
28. The Commonwealth argued that "Anthony Ramsey's status, at the time he provided
the crucial information to the police, was essentially that of an eyewitness. Quite obviously he
was not an eyewitness to the crime itself; however, he was an eyewitness to the fact that de-
fendant admitted culpability in connection with Mr. Meehan's death." Brief for Appellant at
13, Commonwealth v. Stokes, - Pa. -, 389 A.2d 74 (1978). The court in Stokes rejected this
argument without discussion. - Pa. at -, 389 A.2d at 77.
court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to satisfy the
"basis of knowledge" prong of the test because Ramsey neither pos-
sessed personal knowledge of the crime nor provided a detailed ac-
count of the defendant's criminal activity.29 Furthermore, the record
did not indicate the "circumstances under which Stokes' admission
was made and as to Ramsey's relationship with Stokes which might
have explained why Stokes would have divulged such self-incrimi-
nating information to him."3 The Commonwealth failed to satisfy
the "veracity prong" of the test because no evidence supported the
arresting officer's belief that Ramsey was a credible person or that
his information was reliable:3 the informant was not previously
known to the police, nor had he given information to them prior to
this occasion.32 Moreover, Ramsey did not come foreward to report
the crime as a "disinterested citizen complainant," but rather, re-
mained silent until he was contacted by the police more than six
weeks after the crime.33
Unable to satisfy the Aguilar-Spinelli test, the Commonwealth
argued that the lower court should have applied the "substantial ba-
sis" test of United States v. Harris34 rather than the Aguilar-Spinelli
standard. 35  In Jones v. United States,36 a pre-Aguilar case that for-
mulated a "substantial basis" test for determining when information
29. - Pa. at -, 389 A.2d at 77. "The mere fact that 'the crime precedes the tip' does not
lessen the amount of detail necessary to support the accusation; indeed, more detail should
properly be required where a crime has been committed, since there will be more time for
rumor and falsification." Comment, 20 S.D. L. REV. 363, supra note 21, at 369 (citing United
States v. Marihart, 472 F.2d 809, 814 n.6 (8th Cir. 1972)).
30. - Pa. at -, 389 A.2d at 77.
31. In reaching this conclusion, the court found that the question posed to Ramsey by the
interviewing officer "partially suggested the answer which Ramsey gave." Therefore, the court
ruled that his information could not be considered reliable in that it independently corrobo-
rated information already obtained by the police. - Pa. at -, 389 A.2d at 78.
One of the factors stressed by the Court in Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972), indi-
cating that the informer was reliable was that he exposed himself to prosecution if the tip was
false. Accord, United States v. Pearce, 356 F. Supp. 756 (E.D. Pa. 1973). Using this reasoning
the Commonwealth argued that the information given to the police was reliable because the
making of a false crime report is a criminal offense. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4906 (Purdon
1973); Brief for Appellant at 14 n.6, Commonwealth v. Stokes, - Pa. -, 389 A.2d 74 (1978).
The Stokes opinion did not address this issue. One commentator, however, has not given
much credence to this argument, saying that it "would not be persuasive absent a showing that
the informant was aware that such an offense existed and that he faced a real risk of prosecu-
tion should his information prove false." LaFave, supra note 2, at 34.
32. "ITihe length of time the officer has known and dealt with the informer, ... [and]
. . . the number of tips received," may prove the present credibility of the informant. Com-
ment, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 840, supra note 21, at 850. But see Rebell, supra note 3, at 714 (past
instances of reliability provide no assurance of the present trustworthiness of the informant).
33. - Pa. at -, 389 A.2d at 77. "Several courts have recognized a presumption of credi-
bility for a private citizen who comes forward to give information" to the police. Comment, 20
S.D. L. REV. 363, supra note 21, at 370 (citing French v. State, 256 Ark. 298, 506 S.W.2d 820
(1974); State v. Lindquist, 295 Minn. 398, 205 N.W.2d 333 (1973); State v. Perry, 499 S.W.2d
473 (Mo. 1973); State v. Chatmon, 9 Wash. App. 741, 515 P.2d 530 (1973)).
34. 403 U.S. 573 (1971). See notes 38-39 and accompanying text infra.
35. - Pa. at -, 389 A.2d at 78.
36. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
supplied by an informant will be sufficient to establish probable
cause, the Court concluded that hearsay evidence could be used to
support the issuance of a search warrant when there was a "substan-
tial basis" for crediting the hearsay.37 The Supreme Court's recent
decision in Harris, while not specifically overruling Aguilar and
Spinelli, appears to return to the "substantial basis" standard of
Jones.38 The Harris decision involved the sufficiency of an affidavit
based upon hearsay to establish probable cause for the issuance of a
search warrant. Although under the Aguilar-Spinelli standard the
affidavit was inadequate, the Court applied the "substantial basis"
test of Jones and held that it did contain sufficient indicia of reliabil-
ity to establish probable cause.39
The court in Stokes, noting little distinction between the Agul-
lar-Spinelli standard and the "substantial basis" approach of Harris,
stated that regardless which test is used, "the object of a probable-
cause analysis remains the same, viz., to determine if the informant
was trustworthy or his information reliable."'  The court, therefore,
37. Id at 272.
38. The commentators are divided on whether the "substantial basis" test is available to
the courts as a distinct and alternative reliability test to the two-pronged test of Aguilar and
Spinelli. Some writers feel that the "substantial basis" test of Harris can be used by the courts
in lieu of the Aguilar-Spinelli standard. Note, 43 U. COLO. L. REV. 357, supra note 21, at 368;
40 FORDHAM L. REV. 687, 697 (1972); 47 NOTRE DAME LAW. 632, 633-34, 643 (1972). At least
two commentators agree that Harris has not greatly changed the 4guilar rule. Rebell, supra
note 3, at 707-08. Judge Moylan, in a frequently cited article, has stated his view on the subject
as follows:
The prosecution, unable to pass traditional muster according to Aguilar and
Spineli, is increasingly urging that it has an alternative arrow in its constitutional
quiver. There seems to be abroad - particularly in the wake of Harris - an insidu-
ous and recently growing myth that some diffuse "substantial basis" test - growing
out of Draper and Jones, invigorated by the rhetoric of United States v. Ventresca,
and sanctioned by Harris - is available as a distinct and alternative trustworthiness
test to the traditional analysis of Aguilar and Spinelli. There is, to be sure, an elusive
quality to this thesis of diffuse and non-particularized reliance which makes it diffi-
cult to pinpoint precisely where it goes astray.
The cases themselves are reconciled and rumors of their estrangement,
ill-founded. There is simply no "substantial-basis-for-crediting" or "totality-of cir-
cumstances" alternative test. Those who posit a looser approach offer not an alterna-
tive analysis but only a flight from analysis. One standard still prevails for the
evaluation of hearsay information in a probable cause setting.
Moylan, supra note 21, at 781, 786 (footnotes omitted).
39. The affidavit in Harris was based upon an informant's tip that recited the informant's
personal knowledge of the accused's "being a trafficker of nontaxpaid distilled spirits." 403
U.S. at 575. This knowledge was obtained through the informant's observation and purchase
of the liquor from the accused. The affidavit also alleged that the affiant found the informant
"to be a prudent person" and that the accused had a reputation as a trafficker of spirits for four
years prior to the search, and that other sources had provided similar tips to the affiant as well.
Id at 575. Chief Justice Burger, writing for a plurality of the Court, found that the inform-
ant's detailed report of his personal observation, when coupled with the police investigator's
knowledge of Harris' reputation and the informer's self-implication in crime, was sufficient to
meet the "substantial basis" test.
40. - Pa. at -, 389 A.2d at 78. Judge Moylan described the purpose of the Aguilar-
Spinelli test in a similar manner:
I have chosen "trustworthiness" to refer to the general purpose of Aguilar's "two-
pronged test" in its entirety. Although "trustworthiness" could well serve as the label
did not find that the lower court erred in applying only the Aguilar-
Spinelli standard, but nonetheless, considered arguments employing
the "substantial basis" test.4
The Commonwealth argued that the police had a substantial
basis for crediting the information supplied by Anthony Ramsey for
the following reasons: (1) the informant was a named citizen and
thus amenable to process; (2) the information was corroborated be-
cause Ramsey had earlier repeated the defendant's admission to
Gregory Staulings; and (3) the information amounted to an admis-
sion by Stokes that would be admissible evidence and legally suffi-
cient to convict and, therefore, should be sufficient to establish
probable cause, since probable cause may be established by less evi-
dence than is necessary to support a conviction.12 The court ex-
amined these three reasons and concluded that they did not justify a
finding of probable cause. First, although the inforrer in Stokes
was named, such identification did not support a finding of probable
cause without further corrobative evidence. 3 Second, the court re-
jected the Commonwealth's argument that Ramsey's information
was corroborated because he had earlier repeated the defendant's
admission to Gregory Staulings." "When two independent infor-
mants' supply the same information about a crime to the police, each
source tends to support the reliability of the other," but in Stokes
"the information came from only one source, Anthony Ramsey."
45
Ramsey's passing of his information to someone other than the po-
lice did not increase its reliability.46 Third, although the court ac-
for either of the two prongs individually, it is clear that both the trustfulness of the
off-warrant declarant and the basis for his statement (direct observation or casual
rumor) go to the question of the hearsay's ultimate "truthworthiness."
Moylan, supra note 21, at 754.
41. - Pa. at -, 389 A.2d at 78.
42. In support of this argument the Commonwealth cited Commonwealth v. Bradley, 449
Pa. 19, 295 A.2d 842 (1972). Brief for Appellant at 15, Commonwealth v. Stokes, - Pa. -,
389 A.2d 74 (1978). In Bradley, the court considered whether the confession of a participant in
a crime, which implicated a co-participant, was sufficient to establish probable cause for the
co-participant's arrest. In resolving this question the court stated,
It has long been the law of Pennsylvania that the uncorroborated testimony of
an accomplice is sufficient to convict a defendant. In light of the fact that probable
cause may be established by less evidence than would be sufficient to support a convic-
tion, it would be quite inconsistent to hold that information supplied by a confessed ac-
complice cannot form the basis for probable cause to arrest.
id at 21-22, 295 A.2d at 844 (emphasis added) (citations and footnotes omitted).
43. - Pa. at -, 389 A.2d at 78. See Commonwealth v. Milliken, 450 Pa. 310, 300 A.2d
78 (1973), in which the court declared, "If a police officer's sworn statement that the informant
is reliable is not sufficient basis to establish reliability, . . . it is difficult to perceive how the
mere mention of the informant's name in the affidavit could possibly satisfy the constitutional
requirements of Aguilar and Spinelli." Id at 315-16, 300 A.2d at 81-82 (footnotes omitted).
But see United States v. Spach, 518 F.2d 866 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Roman, 451 F.2d
579 (4th Cir. 1971). See also Commonwealth v. Lassiter, 457 Pa. 582, 321 A.2d 902 (1974);
Commonwealth v. Whitehouse, 222 Pa. Super. Ct. 127, 292 A.2d 469 (1972).
44. -Pa. at -, 389 A.2d at 78.
45. Id.
46. Id
knowledged that the defendant's incriminating statements would be
admissible evidence and legally sufficient to convict the defendant, it
nevertheless held that "an admission transmitted through an inform-
ant is only as reliable as its conduit is trustworthy."47 Since the
Commonwealth did not establish the trustworthiness of its inform-
ant, the defendant's damaging admission could not serve as the basis
for probable cause to arrest him.48
Justice Pomeroy filed a dissent, 49 in which he agreed with the
majority that the police did not have sufficient reliable information
to establish probable cause for a warrantless arrest. The Justice felt,
however, that if the confession, which the defendant gave after his
illegal arrest, was voluntarily and intelligently made, it should not be
excluded at trial.5" Citing the American Law Institute's Model Code
of Pre-arraignment Procedure,5 which would admit into evidence a
confession given subsequent to an illegal arrest if the arresting officer
had a "fair basis" for believing that probable cause existed to arrest
the defendant, Justice Pomeroy advocated that the case be remanded
for a determination as to the voluntariness of defendant's statement,
since in his opinion the arresting officer had such a basis for believ-
ing that probable cause existed to arrest Stokes.52
47. Id
48. Id
49. Justice Larsen also wrote a very brief dissenting opinion in which he disagreed with
the majority because he felt that "[elvidence which is sufficient to convict a defendant ought to
be sufficient to form the basis for probable cause to arrest the defendant." Id at -, 389 A.2d
at 79.
50. Id Stokes gave a confession to the police approximately one hour after his arrest.
Record, at 70a, 71a, 74a-76a, Commonwealth v. Stokes, - Pa. -, 389 A. 2d 74 (1978). The
suppression court made no determination as to the voluntariness of the statements given by the
defendant following his arrest. - Pa. at -, 389 A.2d at 76 n.4.
51. Id at -, 389 A.2d at 79. Justice Pomeroy cited Section 9.02 of the Proposed Official
Draft of the Model Code, MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 9.02 (Tent.
Draft No. 1, 1966), which is identical to § 150.2(2) of the Model Code of Pre-Arraignment
Procedure that was adopted by the American Law Institute on May 20, 1975. Justice Pomeroy
has consistently advocated the adoption of § 150.2(2) of the Model Code of Pre-Arraignment
Procedure. See Commonwealth v. Brooks, 468 Pa. 547, 561-63, 364 A.2d 652, 659-60 (1976)
(concurring opinion); Commonwealth v. Richards, 458 Pa. 455, 469-70, 327 A.2d 63, 69-70
(1974) (dissenting opinion); In re Betrand, 451 Pa. 381, 392-95, 303 A.2d 486, 492-93 (1973)
(concurring opinion).
52. The Commonwealth could have advanced in Stokes the argument that even if the
arrest was illegal, the defendant's statements were admissible under the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), in which the Court posed at least two
instances when a post-illegal arrest confession is admissible: (I) If the confession is "suffi-
ciently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion." Id at 486; or
(2) If the "connection between the arrest and the statement had 'become so attenuated as to
dissipate the taint.' " Id at 491. On the basis of the Wong Sun decision, Pennsylvania courts
have permitted statements following an illegal arrest or search to be admitted into evidence.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wright, 460 Pa. 247, 332 A.2d 809 (1975); Commonwealth v.
Garvin, 448 Pa. 258, 293 A.2d 33 (1972); Commonwealth v. Bishop, 425 Pa. 175, 228 A.2d 661
(1967); Commonwealth v. Waters, 248 Pa. Super. Ct. 123, 374 A.2d 1348 (1977); Common-
wealth v. Richard, 233 Pa. Super. Ct. 254, 336 A.2d 423 (1975). But cf. Brown v. Illinois, 422
U.S. 590 (1975) (Miranda warnings alone are not always sufficient to purge the taint of an
unlawful arrest). For a discussion of the admissibility of confessions following illegal arrests,
see Comment, Voluntary Incriminating Statements Made Subsequent to an Illegal Arrest - A
The importance of Commonwealth v. Stokes lies in its examina-
tion of the standards to be applied in determining when information
supplied by an informant is sufficient to establish probable cause for
an arrest. Significant in this case was the court's rejection of the
Commonwealth's contention that the lower court should have ap-
plied the "substantial basis" test of United States v. Harris rather
than the Aguilar-Spinelli standard in determining whether the police
had probable cause to arrest the defendant. By rejecting this argu-
ment, the court indicated that the Aguilar-Spinelli test remains the
primary test Pennsylvania courts will utilize in determining the trust-
worthiness of an informant's tip. Furthermore, the decision is note-
worthy for rejecting the proposition that information that would be
legally sufficient to convict the defendant will always be sufficient to
establish probable cause for his arrest.
Proposed Modification of the Exclusionary Rule, 71 DICK. L. REV. 573 (1967); Note, Admissi-
bility of Confessions Made Subsequent to an IllegalArrest." Wong Sun Y United States Revisited,
61 J. CRiM. L.C. & P.S. 207 (1970).
[Casenote by Thomas J. Rueter]
